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ABSTRACT: It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge 
attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by 
standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with 
contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue 
that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our 
intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve 
our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the 
view that one’s epistemic position may vary with contexts in an epistemically 
interesting way. Some had argued that epistemic position is incompatible with 
intellectualism. In reply, I point out that position variantism and intellectualism 
are compatible, if one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p can vary with 
contexts in an epistemically interesting way. 
KEYWORDS: contextualism, stakes-shifting cases, relevant alternative, 
epistemic standard, intellectualism, sensitivity 
 
1. Introduction 
Let us say that S knows that p only if S’s epistemic position with respect to p 
satisfies the standards for knowledge in play. I take S’s epistemic position with 
respect to p to be a placeholder indicating the properties the having enough of 
which will render S’s true belief that p knowledge.1 It is customary to talk about 
the strength of S’s epistemic position with respect to p or to compare the strength 
of S1’s epistemic position with respect to p to the strength of S2’s epistemic position 
with respect to q. The standards for knowledge specify how strong S’s epistemic 
position with respect to p has to be in order for S to know that p.  
We may call the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with 
contexts in an epistemically interesting (non-trivial) way ‘standards variantism.’ 
Epistemic contextualism is a kind of standards variantism. On contextualism, the 
                                                        
1 See Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 7. 
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standards for knowledge vary with the attributor context.2 What John MacFarlane 
calls relativism is also a kind of standards variantism.3 On relativism, the standards 
for knowledge vary with the assessor context.  
Many have argued that standards variantism (contextualism in particular) is 
directly supported by ordinary cases of knowledge attributions of the following 
sort: 
Airport. Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain 
flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in 
Chicago. They overhear someone ask a passenger Smith if he knows whether the 
flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel 
agent and responds, “Yes, I know—it does stop in Chicago.” It turns out that Mary 
and John have a very important business contact they have to make at the 
Chicago airport. Mary says, “How reliable is that itinerary? It could contain a 
misprint. They could have changed the schedule at the last minute.” Mary and 
John agree that Smith doesn’treally know that the plane will stop in Chicago. 
They decide to check with the airline agent.4 
Suppose that Smith believes truly that the flight stops in Chicago. Intuitively, both 
Smith’s knowledge attribution “I know the flight stops in Chicago” and Mary and 
John’s attribution “Smith does not know that the flight stops in Chicago” seem 
true. This intuition is puzzling since Smith’s belief that the flight stops in Chicago 
is held fixed, and the only difference between Smith’s situation and Mary and 
John’s is that the stakes in whether the flight stops in Chicago are high for Mary 
and John but low for Smith. Stakes are pragmatic, non-truth-relevant, factors that 
seem to have no direct bearing on whether one knows or not (at least initially). 
Many have claimed that standards variantism offers the best explanation of 
our intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases5 such as 
Airport; stakes-shifting cases are supposed to provide prima facie support for 
standards variantism. Call this the standards-variantist assumption.  
                                                        
2 See David Kaplan, “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and 
Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals,” in Themes from Kaplan, eds. Joseph 
Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 481–566. 
3 See John MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” in Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology, eds. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, vol. 1 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005), 197–233. 
4 Stewart Cohen, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reason,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 13 (1999): 58. 
5 This term is from Jonathan Schaffer, “The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism.” Philosophical Studies 127, 3(2006): 87-107. 
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In this paper, I argue against the standards-variantist assumption. My first 
thesis is that preserving our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in 
stakes-shifting cases requires us to endorse position variantism, the view that the 
subject’s epistemic position with respect to p varies with stakes-shifting cases. I 
will first reconstruct the main argument for the standards-variantist assumption 
(Section 2). I will then argue that no prominent account of the standards for 
knowledge can account for our stakes-shifting cases (Sections 3-6).  
One might argue that position variantism is incompatible with 
intellectualism,6 a view that the factors that turn one’s true belief into knowledge 
are exclusively truth-relevant. I reject this argument. More precisely, my second 
thesis is that position variantism is compatible with intellectualism if one’s truth-
relevant factors with respect to p vary with stakes-shifting cases. I will point out 
that the last view is far from being implausible. I will first argue that the position-
variantist explanation can account for our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases 
(Section 7). I will also consider an important objection to position variantism 
(Section 8).  
2. The Argument for the Standards-Variantist Assumption 
Contextualists argue that stakes-shifting cases provide prima facie support for 
contextualism. For instance, Keith DeRose has claimed that stakes-shifting cases 
are “the best ground”7 for the contextualist theory: 
[Stakes-shifting cases] provide us with the best possible type of evidence you 
could ask for that ‘know(s)’ is context-sensitive in at least roughly the way 
contextualists claim it is.8 
Similarly, Stewart Cohen also claims that: 
[Airport], and others like it, strongly suggests that ascription of knowledge are 
context-sensitive. The standards that determine how good one’s reasons have to 
be in order to know are determined by the context of ascription.9 
                                                        
6 The term is from Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2005). Stanley’s formulation is slightly different from the one offered here. Jeremy Fantl and 
Matthew McGrath have discussion a very similar view, which they call ‘purism about 
knowledge.’ See Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Also see Footnote 35 below.  
7 DeRose, The Case for Contextualism, 47. 
8 DeRose, 67. 
9 Cohen, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reason,” 59. 
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DeRose’s and Cohen’s remarks are misleading at best. Even if stakes-shifting cases 
did indicate the variability of the standards for knowledge, they would remain 
neutral to different forms of standards variantism. Specifically, they do not support 
DeRose and Cohen’s favorite type of standards variantism (i.e., contextualism) over 
other types of standards variantism (e.g., nonindexical contextualism, relativism10). 
Other standards variantists regard stakes-shifting cases as directly supporting 
standards variantism. Here are MacFarlane’s remarks: 
If I was speaking literally both times [in stakes-shifting cases] and didn’t make a 
mistake, then presumably the standards I must meet in order to count as 
“knowing” must have changed. I met the laxer standards that were in play [in the 
first case], but not the stricter ones that come into play [in the second case].11 
Standards variantists often take the standards-variantist assumption for granted, so 
much so that few have bothered to justify the assumption. Most effort, rather, has 
been dedicated to showing that stakes-shifting cases, when elaborated, support one 
type of standards variantism over another. 
Many non-standards variantists also are sympathetic to the standards-
variantist assumption. Richard Feldman, for instance, has hypothesized the 
variability of the standards for knowledge:  
It may be that knowledge attributions are context dependent. Perhaps the 
ordinary standards for knowledge are somehow flexible. Perhaps, setting aside the 
typical skeptical problems for a moment, it is sometimes true to say that a person 
knows a proposition and sometimes true to deny that the person knows that same 
proposition. Thus, for example, maybe the standards for knowledge shift in such a 
way that in casual conversation just prior to an election for which there are 
reliable polls indicating a clear winner, it is correct to say that we know what the 
outcome will be. Maybe in other contexts stricter standards apply and it is not 
correct to say that. That makes contextualism correct.12 
Why has the standards-variantist assumption been so widely accepted? The 
remainder of this section elaborates what I take to be the main argument for the 
standards-variantist assumption.  
                                                        
10 For nonindexical contextualism, see Berit Brogaard, “In Defence of a Perspectival Semantics 
for ‘Know,’” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, 3 (2008): 439–59 and John MacFarlane, 
“Nonindexical Contextualism,” Synthese 166 (2009): 231–50. For relativism, see MacFarlane, 
“The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions” and Mark Richard, “Contextualism and 
Relativism,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 215–42. Both nonindexical contextualism and 
relativism are able to explain (most) stakes-shifting cases in much the same way as contextualism 
does. 
11 MacFarlane, “The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” 201; my italics. 
12 Richard Feldman, “Contextualism and Skepticism,” Philosophical Perspectives 45 (1999): 111. 
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Let us begin with analyzing the stakes-shifting cases, which are abundant in 
recent literature.13 Such cases are designed to share two features: (a) the same 
knowledge-attributing sentence, say, ‘S knows that p,’ seems true when uttered in 
a context C1 but false when uttered in another context C2, and (b) C1 and C2 are 
basically identical except that someone’s stakes in whether p are high in C2 but low 
in C1. Let us call C1 and C2 ‘LOW’ and ‘HIGH’ respectively (indicating low-stakes 
and high-stakes contexts respectively).  
Let us focus on Airport. We intuitively think that: 
(1) Smith’s utterance “I (Smith) know that the flight stops in Chicago” is true in 
LOW, and Mary and John’s utterance “Smith does not know that the flight 
stops in Chicago” is true in HIGH.14 
On the standards-variantist assumption, (1) directly supports standards variantism; 
standards variantism provides the best explanation of (1).  
The truth value of “S knows that p” is determined by whether S knows that 
p or not. Traditionally, whether S knows that p or not is regarded as depending on 
(a) whether S believes that p or not, (b) whether p is true or not, and (c) whether 
S’s epistemic position with respect to p satisfies the standards for knowledge in play 
or not. 
(A) and (b) are not the issues here, since they remain constant across stakes-
shifting cases. For instance, Smith believes truly that the flight stops in Chicago in 
both LOW and HIGH. Our target is (c). That is, the variability of the truth value of 
“S knows that p” in stakes-shifting cases is generated by S’s epistemic position with 
respect to p satisfying the standards for knowledge in LOW but not in HIGH. 
The following, hence, is plausible:  
(2) If (1), then Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in 
                                                        
13For instance, the Bank Case from Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 4 (1992): 913–29 and the Train Case from 
Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, “Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification,” The 
Philosophical Review 111, 1 (2002): 67–94. Also see Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 
3–5. 
14 Joshua May et al., “Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An 
Empirical Study,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1, 2 (2010): 265–73; Wesley 
Buckwalter, “Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language,” Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology 1, 3 (2010): 395–406. For reply, see Keith DeRose, “Contextualism, 
Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys,” Philosophical Studies 156 (2011): 81–110, and Jonathan 
Schaffer and Joshua Knobe, “Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed,” Noûs 46, 4 (2012): 675–708. It is 
not my intention to settle the issue here. Those who do not think that (1) is our intuitive 
judgment regarding Airport are invited to consider the present thesis as a conditional claim: if (1) 
is indeed our intuitive judgments, then it is best explained by position variantism. 
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Chicago satisfies the standards for knowledge in play in LOW but fails to do 
so in HIGH. 
The consequent of (2) can be satisfied in two prominent ways: 
(2a) Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in Chicago varies 
with LOW and HIGH.  
(2b) The standards for knowledge in play vary with LOW and HIGH. 
Hence, I assume that: 
(3) If Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in Chicago 
satisfies the standards for knowledge in play in LOW but fails to do so in 
HIGH, then either (2a) Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight 
stops in Chicago vary with LOW and HIGH, or (2b) the standards for 
knowledge in play vary with LOW and HIGH. 
It is tempting to deny the first disjunct of the consequent of (3): 
(4) Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in Chicago does 
not vary with LOW and HIGH. 
(4) seems plausible. After all, Smith’s relation to The flight stops in Chicago is held 
fixed across LOW and HIGH—Smith’s evidence for The flight stops in Chicago, for 
instance, seems to remain the same in LOW and HIGH (however, I will argue that 
we should deny (4). See Section 7). 
(1)-(4) entail: 
(5) The standards for knowledge in play vary with LOW and HIGH. 
(1)-(5) constitute a very strong argument for the standards-variantist assumption. 
The argument is valid, and all of its premises seem plausible. No wonder the 
standards-variantist assumption is widely accepted. 
The argument is not sound, however. The following four sections examine 
all prominent accounts of the standards for knowledge. I argue that all of them fail 
to support (5). Admittedly, such an argument strategy does not offer any 
conclusive objection against standards variantism. But if what is said below is 
correct, it will at least show that standards variantism is ill-motivated.  
3. The Nature of the Standards for Knowledge 
On the standards-variantist assumption, the difference in linguistic dispositions 
between Smith and Mary/John is best explained by the difference in the standards 
for knowledge between LOW and HIGH. This provides us with a basis to test the 
standards-variantist assumption. That is, if our intuitions concerning Smith’s and 
Mary and John’s knowledge-attribution dispositions manifest the systematic 
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differences predicted by the variation of the standards for knowledge, standards 
variantism offers (or at least is in a position to offer) a proper explanation for 
stakes-shifting cases; otherwise, not. 
A question immediately arises: what is the nature of the standards for 
knowledge? Without knowing what the standards for knowledge are, the 
standards-variantist assumption is simply non-evaluable. Here, my strategy is to 
examine all (prominent) accounts of the standards for knowledge, evaluate them 
individually, and see whether or not they can account for our intuitions 
concerning knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases.  
Jonathan Schaffer has offered a useful framework for my project.15 As 
Schaffer points out, the term ‘the shift of the standards for knowledge,’ when used 
by contextualists, may mean three different things: in his terms, the shift of 
‘threshold,’ ‘standard,’ or ‘alternative.’ Schaffer focuses mainly on contextualism, 
but his framework can be extended to cover standards variantism in general 
without losing its plausibility. At any rate, this is how I will proceed. A caveat: the 
following will focus on how contextualists characterize epistemic standard rather 
than how other non-contextualist epistemologists characterize epistemic standard. 
While it is worth extending the following argument to cover what non-
contextualists epistemologists have to say on this topic, this goes beyond the scope 
of the present study. As will become clear, we will have enough on our plate.  
Following Schaffer’s framework, I will distinguish two main accounts of the 
standards for knowledge, which I call the general and particular accounts. 
According to the general account, the shift of the standards for knowledge will 
affect any proposition with a certain property. The effect of the standards for 
knowledge over the logical space is, in Schaffer’s term, “globally encompassing.” 
The particular account contends that the shift of the standards for knowledge 
affects only a specific set of propositions that does not form a globally 
encompassing logical space. The effect of the standards on the logical space is, in 
Schaffer’s term, “pointlike.”  
As a start, it is useful to describe the structure of my argument: according to 
our intuitions, a certain knowledge attribution, say, “S knows that p,” is true in 
LOW but false in HIGH. In principle, we can find a proposition q (q  p) such that 
q is an epistemic counterpart of p for S in LOW, while q is an epistemic 
counterpart of p for S in C if and only if the strength of S’s epistemic position with 
respect to q is on epistemic par with the strength of S’s epistemic position with 
respect to p in C. Suppose that S believes truly that q. Intuitively, we take “S knows 
that q” to be true in LOW as well. I will construct a certain epistemic counterpart q 
                                                        
15 See Schaffer, “What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives?” 
Kok Yong Lee 
60 
of p for S in LOW such that we intuitively think that “S knows that p” is false in 
HIGH, but that “S knows that q” is true in HIGH. I then argue that neither the 
general nor particular account is able to account for our intuitions regarding such 
knowledge attributions. More precisely, the general account has no resources for 
predicting that “S knows that q” is true in HIGH, while the particular account has 
no non-arbitrary way of making the prediction. 
4. The Linear Account 
There are two types of the general account. Call them the linear and spherical 
accounts. The linear account takes the standards for knowledge as specifying a 
threshold for S’s epistemic position with respect to p such that S can be truthfully 
described as “knows that p” only if S’s epistemic position with respect to p meets 
the threshold. 
Two prominent linear accounts suggest themselves. According to the 
evidentialist account, the standards for knowledge set the threshold for the 
strength of evidence such that the strength of S’s evidence for p must reach a 
certain threshold in order for S to be counted as “knows that p.” On the reliabilist 
account, by contrast, the standards for knowledge set the threshold for the degree 
of reliability of belief-forming processes such that the degree of reliability of the 
process that forms S’s belief that p must meet the threshold in order for S to be 
counted as “knows that p.” I will focus on the reliabilist account, but the same 
point also applies to the evidentialist account.  
Suppose that, in LOW, the degree of reliability of the belief-forming process 
of Smith’s belief that the flight stops in Chicago is .80 (‘the degree of reliability of 
Smith’s belief is .80’ in short). Moreover, suppose that, according to the standards 
for knowledge in play, the threshold of the degree of reliability in HIGH is .95, 
while the threshold in LOW is .75. The reliabilist account typically explains 
Airport as follows: 
Smith’s knowledge claim “I know that the flight stops in Chicago” is true in LOW 
since the degree of reliability of Smith’s belief that the flight stops in Chicago 
meets the (low) threshold for the degree of reliability. By contrast, Mary and 
John’s denial of knowledge “Smith does not know that the flight stops in Chicago” 
is also true in HIGH since the degree of reliability of Smith’s belief that the flight 
stops in Chicago is held fixed, and the latter does not meet the (high) standards in 
play in HIGH. 
To test the reliabilist account’s explanation, let us consider the epistemic 
counterparts of The flight stops in Chicago for Smith in LOW, i.e., Smith’s beliefs 
whose degree of reliability is also .80 in LOW.  
Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered—What Shifts? Epistemic Standards or Position? 
61 
Consider: 
Airport′. Everything is like Airport except that Mary and John and Smith are 
friends, and that Mary and John know that Smith is a Lakers fan. Suppose that 
Mary knows that the Lakers won yesterday, and she also knows that Smith 
believes that the Lakers won yesterday since she saw him reading today The New 
York Times. Suppose that, in LOW, Smith’s epistemic position with respect to 
The flight stops in Chicago is epistemically equivalent to his epistemic position 
with respect to The Lakers won yesterday. Suppose that, on their way to find the 
airline agent to check on the flight schedule, Mary and John are chatting. John 
asks Mary whether Smith knows that the Lakers won yesterday.  
Consider two possible situations: 
Airport(a). Mary says to John, “Yes, Smith knows the Lakers won yesterday.” 
Airport(b). Mary says to John, “No, he doesn’t. Smith believes truly that the 
Lakers won yesterday, but he does not know.” 
Intuitively, Airport(a), rather than Airport(b), is the natural reply. I contend that a 
correct account of the standards for knowledge should be able to handle Airport’. 
Unfortunately, however, the way the reliabilist account handles Airport 
cannot be employed to account forAirport'. Let us elaborate.  
Airport′ is so stipulated such that:  
(6) In LOW, Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in 
Chicago is epistemically equivalent to his epistemic position with respect to 
The Lakers won yesterday. 
On the reliabilist account, the strength of one’s epistemic position with respect to p 
should be characterized by the degree of reliability of one’s belief that p. Hence, 
from (6), the reliabilist account implies: 
(7) In LOW, the degree of reliability of Smith’s belief that the flight stops in 
Chicago is the same as the degree of reliability of Smith’s belief that the 
Lakers won yesterday.  
It is worth noting that standards variantismis compatible with position 
variantism. Proponents of standards variantism, however, usually assume that one’s 
epistemic position does not vary with stakes-shifting cases—most (if not all) 
standards variantists are position invariantists. This assumption seems natural given 
that the standards-variantist assumption implies that one’s epistemic position is not 
responsible for the shift in our intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in 
stakes-shifting cases. At any rate, proponents of standards variantism have 
endorsed: 
(8) Smith’s epistemic position with respect to p does not vary with LOW and 
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HIGH. 
(7) and (8) entail: 
(9) In HIGH, the degree of reliability of Smith’s belief that the flight stops in 
Chicago is the same as the degree of reliability of Smith’s belief that the 
Lakers won yesterday. 
Arguably, (9) leads to: 
(10) In HIGH, Smith knows that the flight stops in Chicago if and only if Smith 
knows that the Lakers won yesterday. 
But, according to our initial intuitions regarding Airport′, it seems that: 
(11) In HIGH, Smith does not know that the flight stops in Chicago. 
From (10) and (11), we can conclude: 
(12) In HIGH, Smith does not know that the Lakers won yesterday.  
This argument is valid. Proponents of the reliabilist account, as I see it, must accept 
all the premises. However, (12) indicates that Airport(b) rather than Airport(a) is 
the natural follow-up of Airport′. Counterintuitive. 
Since infinitely many counterexamples can be constructed along this line 
and against another linear account such as the evidentialist account, the prospect 
of the linear account is dim. Without further ado, let us consider the other type of 
the general account. 
5. The Spherical Account 
On the spherical account, possible worlds can be ordered to form a certain “sphere” 
with the actual world serving at its center. The distance between possible worlds is 
often regarded as a function of the (overall) similarity between them.16 The 
strength of S’s epistemic position with respect to p is determined by the number of 
possible worlds in (or the area of) a possible-world sphere in which S can maintain 
a certain (epistemic) relation R to p. The stronger S’s epistemic position with 
respect to p, the larger the number of possible worlds in (or the area of) the 
possible-world sphere in which S can maintain a relation R to p in the possible-
world sphere.  
The standards for knowledge specify an area of a sphere, which can be used 
to evaluate different spheres. A sphere may have an area identical to, smaller than, 
or larger than the one specified by the standards for knowledge. S’s epistemic 
                                                        
16 See Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (New York: Clarendon Press, 2005); Wolfgang Freitag, 
“Safety, Sensitivity and ‘Distant’ Epistemic Luck,” Theoria 80 (2014): 44–61. 
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position with respect to p satisfies the standards for knowledge if and only if S can 
maintain a relation R to p in the sphere whose area is no smaller than the area 
specified by the standards. Using the notion of an area of a sphere, the same 
standards for knowledge can be applied to different subjects and/or different 
propositions. For instance, to say that the strength of S1’s epistemic position with 
respect to p is stronger than the strength of S2’s epistemic position with respect to q 
(where S1 S2 and p  q) is tantamount to saying that the area of the sphere with 
respect to which S1 can maintain a relation R to p is larger than the area of the 
sphere with respect to which S2 can maintain a relation R to q. 
Different spherical accounts will formulate the (epistemic) relation R 
differently. In this section, I will only examine the sensitivity account, which is the 
most prominent spherical account. On this account, S’s epistemic position is 
determined by the sensitivity of S’s belief that p with respect to a sphere s, where 
S’s belief that p is sensitive with respect to s if and only if S believes truly that p in 
the center world and, for all possible worlds w in s, (i) p is false in w, and (ii) S does 
not believe that p in w.17 That the strength of S1’s epistemic position with respect 
to p is stronger than S2’s epistemic position with respect to q implies that the area 
of the sphere with respect to which S1’s belief that p is sensitive is larger than the 
area of the sphere with respect to which S2’s belief that q is sensitive. The standards 
for knowledge specify an area r such that the area of the sphere with respect to 
which S’s belief that p is sensitive must not be smaller than r in order for S to be 
counted as “knows that p.” In other words, S’s epistemic position with respect to p 
satisfies the standards for knowledge if and only if the area of the sphere with 
respect to which S’s belief that p is sensitive is no smaller than the area specified by 
the standards. Hence, to say that the standards for knowledge are context-sensitive 
amounts to saying that the area of the sphere with respect to which one’s belief 
that p must remain sensitive in order to be counted as “knows that p” may vary 
with contexts.18 
The sensitivity account typically explains Airport as follows:  
The flight stops in Chicago in the actual world. The possible worlds in which the 
flight does not stop in Chicago form a possible-world sphere swith the actual 
world serving as its center. Let the possible-world sphere s' be a subset of s such 
that, for all w' in s', Smith does not believe that the flight stops in Chicago in w', 
and the possible-world sphere s'' be a subset of s and of which s' is a proper subset 
such that, for some w'' in s'', Smith believes that the flight stops in Chicago in 
                                                        
17 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1981). 
18 See Keith DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review 104, 1 (1995): 1–52. 
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w''.It follows that Smith’s belief that the flight stops in Chicago is sensitive with 
respect to s' but insensitive with respect to s''.  
In LOW, the standards for knowledge are relatively low such that they specify a 
(relatively small) area r, whichis smaller than the area of s'. Since Smith’s belief 
that the flight stops in Chicago is sensitive with respect to s', his belief satisfies the 
standards for knowledge in LOW. Therefore, “Smith knows that the flight stops 
in Chicago” is true in LOW.  
However, in HIGH, the standards for knowledge are stringent such that they 
specify a (relatively large) area r', which is larger than the area of s''. Since Smith’s 
belief that the flight stops in Chicago is insensitive with respect to s'', his belief 
does not satisfy the standards for knowledge in HIGH. Therefore, “Smith does not 
know that the flight stops in Chicago” is also true in HIGH.  
The way the sensitivity account handles Airport, however, cannot be 
employed to account for Airport'. Let us elaborate.  
Airport′  is so stipulated such that: 
(6) In LOW, Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in 
Chicago is epistemically equivalent to his epistemic position with respect to 
The Lakers won yesterday. 
According to the spherical account, to say that S1’s epistemic position with respect 
to p is epistemically equivalent to S2’s epistemic position with respect to q amounts 
to saying that the area of the sphere with respect to which S1’s belief that p remains 
sensitive is identical to the area of the sphere with respect to which S2’s belief that 
q remains sensitive. That is, (6) is tantamount to:  
(13) The area of the sphere s' with respect to which Smith’s belief that the flight 
stops in Chicago remains sensitive in LOW is identical to the area of the 
sphere v with respect to which Smith’s belief that the Lakers won yesterday 
remains sensitive in LOW. 
As noted, standards variantists assume that: 
(8) Smith’s epistemic position with respect to p does not vary with LOW and 
HIGH. 
(8) and (13) entail: 
(14) The area of the sphere s' with respect to which Smith’s belief that the flight 
stops in Chicago remains sensitive in HIGH is identical to the area of the 
sphere v with respect to which Smith’s belief that The Lakers won yesterday 
remains sensitive in HIGH. 
On the sensitivity account’s explanation of Airport, the following holds: 
(15) In HIGH, Smith’s belief that the flight stops in Chicago is insensitive. 
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(15) indicates that the area of the sphere s' with respect to which Smith’s belief 
that the flight stops in Chicago remains sensitive is smaller than the area specified 
by the standards for knowledge in HIGH. However, given (14), it follows that the 
area of the sphere v with respect to which Smith’s belief that the Lakers won 
yesterday remains sensitive is also smaller than the area specified by the standards 
for knowledge in HIGH. That is, from (14) and (15), we get: 
(16) In HIGH, Smith’s belief that the Lakers won yesterday is insensitive. 
Since S knows that p only if S’s belief that p is sensitive, (16) thus implies: 
(12) In HIGH, Smith does not know that the Lakers won yesterday. 
The argument above is valid. Proponents of the sensitivity account, as I see it, must 
accept all the premises. (12), however, indicates that Airport(b) rather than 
Airport(a) is the natural follow-up of Airport′. Counterintuitive. 
Since infinitely many counterexamples can be constructed along the similar 
line, the argument above indicates that the sensitivity account fails to explain our 
intuitions regarding cases like Airport (and Airport'). Hence, the spherical account 
is not promising in accounting for stakes-shifting cases, either.  
Let us take stock. We have seen that the general account fails to predict the 
variations of the attributor’s linguistic disposition in stakes-shifting cases. Both the 
linear and spherical accounts have suffered from a similar problem, namely, they 
fail to account for our intuitions regarding some epistemic counterparts q of p for S 
in stakes-shifting cases. In the present case, they mistakenly take Airport(b), as 
opposed to Airport(a), as the natural follow-up of Airport′. The moral, I take it, is 
this: in stakes-shifting cases, we intuitively think that the attributors’ linguistic 
dispositions do not undergo a global variation. When the attributor counts the 
subject as “know that p” in LOW but “does not know that p” in HIGH, the 
attributor does not, at least not always, also take the subject as “does not know that 
q” in HIGH for all epistemic counterparts q of p for S in LOW. The fundamental 
flaw of the general accountis its implication that the attributors exhibit a certain 
global variation in their linguistic dispositions in stakes-shifting cases.  
6. The Particular View 
Some standards variantists opt for the particular account according to which the 
variations of the standards for knowledge do not have a global impact on the 
attributor’s linguistic dispositions. The most prominent particular account is the 
relevant alternative account (of the standards for knowledge) (hereafter ‘the RA 
account’). The RA account characterizes the variations of the standards for 
knowledge in terms of the variations of the set of relevant alternatives. The idea is 
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that the subject S counts as “knowing that p” only if S’s epistemic position with 
regard to p enables S to rule out all relevant alternatives to p, specified by the 
standards for knowledge in play. 
The RA account typically explains Airport as follows: 
In Airport, Smith’s evidence is unable to rule out the proposition that The 
itinerary contains a misprint. In LOW, however, the standards for knowledge do 
not specify the proposition to be a relevant alternative. As a result, Smith counts 
as “knows that the flight stops in Chicago” even though he is unable to rule out 
The itinerary contains a misprint. By contrast, the standards for knowledge in 
HIGH do specify The itinerary contains a misprint to be a relevant alternative. 
Accordingly, Mary and John’s utterance “Smith does not know that the flight 
stops in Chicago” is true in HIGH.  
Some might offer a similar RA account’s explanation for Airport′: 
In Airport′, Smith’s evidence is unable to rule out the proposition, say, that The 
New York Times contains a misprint. In HIGH, however, the standards for 
knowledge do not specify the proposition to be a relevant alternative. As a result, 
Smith counts as “knows that the Lakers won yesterday” in HIGH.  
The core of the RA account’s explanation of Airport and Airport′ consists of:  
RA1: The alternative The flight itinerary contains a misprint is relevant in HIGH. 
RA2: The alternative The New York Times contains a misprint is irrelevant in 
HIGH.  
Obviously, proponents of the RA account need to explain why RA1 and RA2 
hold. Otherwise, the RA account’s explanation is just an ad hoc story tailor-made 
to account for whatever our intuitions are with respect to stakes-shifting cases. 
What we need are principles that determine whether an alternative is relevant or 
not. Call them ‘principles of relevance.’ The importance of specifying the principles 
of relevance cannot be overemphasized. “The success of the RA approach,” as 
Vogel puts it, “depends upon there being a principled distinction between relevant 
and irrelevant alternatives.”19 
David Lewis was the first to articulate a complex system of principles of 
relevance (hereafter ‘the Lewisian system’).20 For the present purposes, it is 
appropriate to focus on the Lewisian system, since it remains one of the most 
comprehensive accounts on the market. 
                                                        
19 Jonathan Vogel, “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 
(1999): 168. 
20 David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 4 (1996): 549–67. 
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A key feature of the Lewisian system is that its principles are motivated 
solely by our pre-theoretically intuitive judgments concerning knowledge 
attributions, an approach much like what Roderick Chisholm calls 
“particularism.”21 Such a particularist approach is especially dubious if our 
intuitions lead to theoretically incoherent principles, or if they generate conflicting 
judgments. Indeed, such problems crop up in the Lewisian system. As Lewis 
notices, some of his principles will lead to skepticism if not restrained by certain ad 
hoc conditions22—Lewis bravely and blatantly admits that he has no solution to 
this problem. Lewis also considers the possibility that people may have intuitions 
incompatible with the Lewisian system’s verdicts, and his response, surprisingly 
again, is simply to give in and conclude that “we have reached a standoff.”23 
While I believe that such general problems are very serious—and they may 
very well be the root of all the problems the Lewisian system eventually faces—I 
will not pursue the issue further. Instead, I will continue the argumentative 
strategy of this paper and focus on the question whether or not the Lewisian 
system can account for stakes-shifting cases involving epistemic counterparts such 
as Airport'. My answer is that it cannot.  
I offer two reasons. First, the most promising Lewisian principle to handle 
RA2 (i.e., the reliability principle; see below) has failed to do it job. Second, and 
perhaps worse, even granted that the reliability principle can handle RA2, the 
principle still has an undesirable result of falsifying RA1, and there seems to be no 
way, not according tothe Lewisian system anyway, to get rid of this undesirable 
result. I will elaborate them respectively.  
Recall that if RA2 is to hold at all, it has to be sanctioned by the principles of 
relevance specifying the sufficient condition for an alternative being irrelevant. 
Lewis calls them “permissive principles.” He listed four such principles, but only 
one of them is particularly relevant to RA2. Here is how Lewis characterizes the 
principle: “Within limits, we are entitled to take [perception, memory, and 
testimony] for granted.”24 We may formulate this principle as follows: 
The reliability principle. If an alternative p is incompatible with the assumption 
that perception, memory, and testimony do not fail, then, defeasibly, p is not 
relevant.  
                                                        
21 Roderick Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1982), 66. 
22 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” 556. 
23 Lewis, 561. 
24 Lewis, 558. 
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The reliability principle appears to handle RA2 quite well. The alternative The 
New York Times contains a misprint is incompatible with the assumption that 
Smith’s testimony (i.e., The New York Times) does not fail. Hence, The New York 
Times contains a misprint is irrelevant in HIGH.  
Appearances are deceptive, however. A closer scrutiny reveals that there is 
in fact no room for the Lewisian system to account for RA2. To elaborate, notice 
that the reliability principle is defeasible—some other principles may overthrow its 
verdict. Morerover, it does seem that the reliability principle’s verdict on RA2 is 
overthrown by two other Lewisian principles.  
“The possibility that actually obtains,” according to Lewis, “is never properly 
ignored.”25 Hence, the following holds: 
The actuality principle. If p is true in the actual world, then, defeasibly, p is 
always relevant.26 
Moreover, Lewis also thinks that if an alternative resembles another, and if “one of 
them may not be properly ignored, neither may the other.”27 This gives us: 
The resemblance principle. If p saliently resembles q, and p is relevant (in virtue 
of principles other than this one), then, defeasibly, q is relevant.  
The actuality and resemblance principles together imply that RA2 does not hold. 
The actual world in which The New York Times does not contain a misprint 
saliently resembles the counterfactual world in which The New York Times 
contains a misprint—after all, the only difference between these two worlds is that 
The New York Times contains a misprint in one but not in the other. By the 
actuality principle, The New York Times does not contain a misprint is relevant. 
Moreover, since The New York Times does not contain a misprint is relevant, the 
alternative The New York Times contains a misprint is also relevant, by the 
resemblance principle. That is, the actuality and resemblance principles overthrow 
the reliability principle’s verdict on The New York Times contains a misprint.  
Lewis himself has also noted that the application of the actuality principle 
and the resemblance principle has to be restricted; otherwise they will lead to 
skepticism.28 Unfortunately, Lewis admits that he does not know how to give a 
non-ad-hoc restriction. While this is surely a vice for the Lewisian system in 
general, it might be interpreted as a virtue for the particular account, as proponents 
of the particular account can then claim that the aforementioned denial of RA2 is 
                                                        
25 Lewis, 554. 
26 By actuality, Lewis means the subject’s actuality, see Lewis, 554. 
27 Lewis, 556. 
28 Lewis, 556–57. 
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implausible as it is based on an unrestricted usage of the actuality principle and the 
resemblance principle. Whether this is a promising reply depends on whether a 
non-ad-hoc restriction on the usage of these two principles can be offered. 
However, this just brings us back to the problem Lewis is facing. And it seems that 
the prospect of solving it is dim.  
Worse, even if we granted that the reliability principle is able to account for 
RA2, the Lewisian system still fails to account for Airport'. In fact, the reliability 
principle is too strong: not only does it rule that the alternative The New York 
Times contains a misprint is irrelevant in HIGH (i.e., RA2), it also rules that the 
alternative The flight itinerary contains a misprint is irrelevant in HIGH (i.e., the 
denial of RA1). For not only is the alternative The New York Times contains a 
misprint incompatible with the assumption that (Smith’s) testimony (i.e., The New 
Yorks time) does not fail, the alternative The flight itinerary contains a misprint is 
also incompatible with the assumption that (Smith’s) testimony (i.e., the flight 
itinerary) does not fail. In other words, the reliability principle is able to obtain 
RA2 only at the expense of RA1. 
As far as I can tell, there is only one way to get around this problem, that is, 
to argue that the reliability principle’s verdict onThe flight itinerary contains a 
misprint is overthrown by other principles of relevance. In what follows, I will 
examine two most promising candidates that can do the job. I find both of them 
wanting. More precisely, each of the proposed principles is either implausible on 
its own or too strong such that not only does it overthrow the reliability principle’s 
verdict on The flight itinerary contains a misprint, it also overthrows the 
principle’s verdict on The New York Times contains a misprint. In other words, 
either the proposed principles are implausible, or they are able to handle RA2 only 
at the expense of RA1.  
First, on Lewis’s account, “[an alternative] not ignored at all is ipso facto not 
properly ignored.”29 That is: 
The attention principle. If an alternative p is entertained (or is not ignored), then, 
defeasibly, p is relevant. 
The attention principle implies both RA1 and RA2. On the one hand, since Mary 
and John are considering whether the flight itinerary contains a misprint, The 
flight itinerary contains a misprint is relevant in HIGH (thereby overthrowing the 
reliability principle’s verdict, as desired). On the other hand, since The New York 
Times contains a misprint has not been entertained, its status of relevance is not 
affected. 
                                                        
29 Lewis, 559. 
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This reply is problematic since whether The New York Times contains a 
misprint is relevant or not does not seem to depend on whether the possibility of 
The New York Times containing a misprint is entertained in HIGH or not. For 
instance, suppose that we modify Airport(a) as follows: 
Airport(a)*. Mary says to John, “Yes, Smith knows that the Lakers won yesterday. 
The New York Times rarely misprints the result of basketball games.” 
Intuitively, Airport(a)* is still more natural than Airport(b). Yet, in Airport(a)*, The 
New York Times contains a misprint is not ignored and should be counted as 
relevant in HIGH by the attention principle, contradicting RA2.  
More importantly, the attention principle is implausible. It is widely agreed 
that merely entertaining an alternative does not automatically render it relevant.30 
John Hawthorne mentions a possible refinement:  
The attention principle'. If an alternative p is seriously entertained, then, 
defeasibly, p is relevant.31 
Arguably, Mary and John have entertained seriously The flight itinerary contains a 
misprint but not The New York Times contains a misprint. Hence, the attention 
principle' predicts that the former is a relevant alternative (thereby overthrowing 
the reliability principle’s verdict, as desired), while leaving the latter’s status of 
relevance intact. Unfortunately, the attention principle' is still implausible as 
serious attention is not always a sufficient condition for the relevance of 
alternatives. For instance, a paranoiac agent could entertain remote alternatives 
seriously, but that does not automatically render them relevant.32 
Let us look at another proposal. Lewis also thinks that “when error would be 
especially disastrous, few possibilities are properly ignored.”33 Hence: 
The high-stakes principle. If the stakes of p are high, then, defeasibly, few 
alternative q to p are irrelevant.  
Mary and John’s stakes in whether or not the flight itinerary contains a misprint 
are high, but their stakes in whether or not The New York Times contains a 
misprint are low. At first sight, the high-stakes principle appears to correctly 
predict that The flight itinerary contains a misprint is a relevant alternative in 
                                                        
30 John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 63–64; Michael 
Blome-Tillmann, “Knowledge and Presuppositions,” Mind 118, 470 (2009): 246–47. 
31 Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 64. 
32 See Vogel, “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory,” 164ff for more objections to the attention 
principle.  
33 Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge,” 566, Footnote 12. 
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HIGH (thereby overthrowing the reliability principle’s verdict, as desired) while 
leaving the status of relevance of The New York Times contains a misprint intact. 
The high-stakes principle’s prediction of RA1, however, is problematic. 
Specifically, the way the principle renders The flight itinerary contains a misprint 
relevant can be exploited to show that it would be too difficult for Mary and John 
to obtain the knowledge of the flight’s layover. Suppose that Mary and John go to 
check the flight schedule with the airline agent and learn that the flight stops in 
Chicago. Intuitively, they thus know that the flight stops in Chicago—but wait, 
since the stakes are very high, the alternative that the airline agent has misread the 
flight information on the screen should also be relevant, and Mary and John are 
not in a position to rule this alternative out. So, they should not know that the 
flight stops in Chicago after all. Suppose that Mary and John ask the airline agent 
to double check and are told the same answer. Do they know now? Not if they are 
able to rule out the alternative that the airline agent has been impatient with them 
and does not double-check properly—since the stakes are high, this alternative 
should be relevant as well. But they are in no position to rule out that alternative. 
So, they still do not know whether the flight stops in Chicago… This shows that 
the high-stakes principle is not a very plausible explanation of RA1 in the first 
place.  
Let us take stock. In this section, we consider whether or not the RA 
account (or, more precisely, the Lewisian system) is able to handle stakes-shifting 
cases involving epistemic counterparts. Specifically, we ask the question whether 
or not the Lewisian system can give rise to RA1 and RA2. Our examination tells us 
that it cannot. On the one hand, the Lewisian system does not seem to have the 
theoretical resources to handle RA2 in the first place, as the reliability principle’s 
verdict is overthrown the actuality and resemblance principles. One the other 
hand, granted that the reliability principle can handle RA2, the Lewisian system 
now has difficulties handling RA1. Either the principles that get us RA1 are 
implausible on their own (i.e., the attention principle, the attention principle', the 
high-stakes principle) or they are able to handle RA1 only at the expense of RA2 
(i.e., the reliability principle, the attention principle). 
I conclude that the Lewisian system (the RA account) is unable to give a 
non-ad-hoc explanation of why RA1 and RA2 hold. The Lewisian system (the RA 
account), hence, fails to account for stakes-shifting cases like Airport'.  
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7. Position Variantism and Stakes-Shifting Cases 
Where are we now? We have seen that the standards-variantist assumption is 
supported by the argument (1)-(5). If the previous three sections are correct, the 
conclusion (i.e., (5)) is threatened.  
Since (1)-(5) is valid, (at least) one of (1)-(4) has to be rejected. Which one? 
Arguably, (2) and (3) are safe. (2) relies on two intuitive ideas. Firstly, the widely 
accepted account of knowledge that S knows that p if and only if S believes truly 
that p, and S’s epistemic position with respect to p satisfies the standards for 
knowledge in play. Secondly, S believes truly that p in both LOW and HIGH. (3) is 
also unproblematic, since it seems plausible that Smith’s epistemic position with 
respect to The flight stops in Chicago and the standards for knowledge in play do 
not vary with both LOW and HIGH. At any rate, I will not challenge (3) here.  
This leaves us (1) and (4); either the truth value of “Smith knows that the 
flight stops in Chicago” does not vary with LOW and HIGH (i.e., not-(1)), or 
Smith’s epistemic position with respect to p does vary with LOW and HIGH (i.e., 
not-(4)). Put more generally, either we reject our initial intuitions regarding 
knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases—i.e., the truth value of “S knows 
that p” varies with LOW and HIGH—or we endorse what we may call position 
variantism, the view that the subject’s epistemic position with respect to p may 
vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way (in particular, S’s epistemic 
position with respect to p may vary with LOW and HIGH). 
I suggest that we should opt for position variantism, if only to respect our 
initial intuitions. I will not develop a full-fledged account of position variantism 
here. What I will do, rather, is to point out that position variantism is very 
promising in explaining stakes-shifting cases. This gives us the incentive to be 
serious about the view.34 I will then discuss and reject one possible objection to 
position variantism (Section 8).  
On the position-variantist explanation, the variability of the truth value of 
“S knows that p” in stakes-shifting cases is derived from the variability of S’s 
epistemic position with respect to pin such cases. More precisely, S’s epistemic 
position with respect to p is weaker in HIGH than it is in LOW such that, while 
the standards for knowledge in play remain constant across LOW and HIGH, S’s 
epistemic position with respect to p satisfies the standards for knowledge in LOW 
                                                        
34 An additional motivation of position variantism comes from the fact that this view (or 
something along similar lines) can offer the most plausible “contextualist” solution to skepticism. 
See Kok Yong Lee, “On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism,” International Journal 
for the Study of Skepticism 7, 3 (2017): 173–98. 
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but fails to do so in HIGH. Let us, again, focus on Airport. A typical position-
variantist explanation is as follows: 
Smith’s utterance “I know that the flight stops in Chicago” is true in LOW since 
Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in Chicago is strong 
enough to satisfy the standards for knowledge in play. By contrast, Mary and 
John’s utterance “Smith does not know that the flight stops in Chicago” is also 
true in HIGH since Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in 
Chicago is not strong enough to satisfy the (same) standards for knowledge in 
play. 
To test whether this is a plausible account, we may consider Airport'. As noted, we 
intuitively think that Airport(a), rather than Airport(b), is the natural follow-up of 
Airport'. 
To its credit, position variantism can deliver this verdict. According to 
position variantism, Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The flight stops in 
Chicago varies with LOW and HIGH, but this, by itself, does not imply that 
Smith’s epistemic position with respect to The Lakers won yesterday (or any other 
epistemic counterparts of The flight stops in Chicago for Smith) vary with LOW 
and HIGH. 
8. Position Variantism vs. Intellectualism 
Position variantism has its criticisms. One main worry is that position variantism is 
incompatible with a very plausible epistemic principle: 
Intellectualism. The factors that turn one’s true belief into knowledge are 
exclusively truth-relevant.35 
In the present terminology, intellectualism is tantamount to the view that S’s 
epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on S’s truth-relevant 
factors with respect to p. 
Notice that many are willing to assume that: 
(17) S’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p do not vary with LOW and 
HIGH. 
                                                        
35 See DeRose, The Case for Contextualism, 24. For recent criticisms to intellectualism, see 
Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries; Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests; Fantl and 
McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World; Matthew McGrath, “Contextualism and 
Intellectualism,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 383–405. For a recent defense of 
intellectualism, see Kok Yong Lee, “On Two Recent Arguments against Intellectualism,” NCCU 
Philosophical Journal, forthcoming. 
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(17), together with intellectualism, imply that S’s epistemic position with respect to 
p does not vary with LOW and HIGH (i.e., the denial of position variantism). In 
other words, intellectualism and position variantism are incompatible.  
I want to draw a different conclusion, however. I think intellectualism and 
position variantism are compatible; we should give up (17). Arguing against (17), 
however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. Here, I will settle for a weaker 
conclusion. I will argue, instead, that the denial of (17) is not totally implausible, 
and that philosophers are in no position to simply take (17) for granted.  
To make my point, it suffices to show that there are theories on the market 
which (a) are position-variantist in character, and (b) can be employed to falsify 
(17). That is, theories that imply:  
(18) S’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p may vary with LOW and HIGH 
in an epistemically interesting way. 
So long as such theories are plausible enough to deserve serious attention, 
philosophers cannot simply assume (17).  
For simplicity’s sake, I will focus on one such theory. Ram Neta has 
developed a theory of evidence whose core idea is that what counts as one’s 
evidence for p may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way.36 It 
should be noted that although Neta calls himself a “contextualist,” his account does 
not belong to standard-variantism as defined here.37  
Suppose that the set of propositions {p1,…,pn} is S’s evidence for pn+1.38 
Details aside, Neta argues that S’s evidence for pn+1 is affected by the following rule: 
(R) If at time t, S1 raises a hypothesis H that is an uneliminated 
counterpossibility with respect to S2’s knowing that p, then S2’s body of 
evidence at t is to just those pi of {p1,…,pn} that is introspectively available to 
S, at t whether or not H is true,  
where a hypothesis H is an uneliminated counterpossibility with respect to S2’s 
knowing that p just in case (i) H implies that S does not know that p at t, and (ii) H 
                                                        
36 Ram Neta, “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 66, 1 (2003): 1–31. Elsewhere, I discuss Neta's account in more 
detail. See Lee, “On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism,” 13ff. Stanley also mentions 
but does not develop a similar view, but he finds this line of thought “overwhelmingly 
plausible,” see Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 124. 
37 This just means that while Neta is happy to label himself as a ‘contextualist,’ his view (or at 
least an interpretation of it) is in fact radically different from the orthodox contextualism.  
38 Neta takes one’s evidence to be one’s mental states. In this paper, I will simply take one’s 
evidence to be a set of propositions. I do not take a particular stance on the nature of evidence 
here.  
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and “S knows that p at t” are introspectively indistinguishable for S.39 Crucial to (R) 
is the idea that what counts as one’s evidence for p varies with contexts, depending 
on the alternative H to p that is in question in the present context.  
Evidence is a kind of truth-relevant factors. If Neta is right, S’s truth-
relevant factors (i.e., evidence) with respect to p may vary with contexts in an 
epistemically interesting way, depending (in part) on whether an uneliminated 
counterpossibility is raised or not. This result supports (18), for Neta’s theory can 
be naturally extended to account for cases like Airport.  
For instance, in HIGH, Mary has raised an uneliminated counterpossibility 
that the itinerary contains a misprint. According to (R), Smith’s evidence for The 
flight stops in Chicago would be restricted to those propositions that are 
introspectively available to Smith, whether or not the itinerary contains a misprint 
or not. Presumably, Smith’s evidence, so restricted, no longer contains propositions 
such as The itinerary does not contain a misprint. “Smith knows that the flight 
stops in Chicago” is true in LOW but not in HIGH since Smith’s truth-relevant 
factors (i.e., evidence) with respect to The flight stops in Chicago have varied 
across LOWand HIGH, i.e., not-(17). 
I do not intend to argue for Neta’s theory. Nor do I think Neta’s account is 
the only plausible, or tenable, approach to position variantism. My point, rather, is 
to highlight the fact that it is not impossible, nor implausible, to argue for (a kind 
of) position variantism that leads to (18). 
In other words, the fact that Neta’s theory can accommodate (18) should not 
be taken as a direct justification for (18) and/or position variantism. Rather, this 
fact suggests that one is in no position to simply assume that position variantism 
and intellectualism are incompatible. A lot more still needs to be said about 
whether position variantismis in fact a correct view; likewise for whether (18) is a 
correct characterization of stakes-shifting cases like Airport. 
9. Conclusion 
I have shown that (a) our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in 
stakes-shifting cases, (b) position variantism, and (c) standards variantism are 
jointly inconsistent. I suggest that we should give up standards variantism. 
Focusing on Airport, I argue that all prominent accounts of the standards for 
knowledge have failed to deliver the correct verdicts on our intuitions regarding 
stakes-shifting cases.  
                                                        
39 Neta, “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World,” 23–24. 
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The moral is this: the only way we can preserve our initial intuitions 
regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases is to appeal to position 
variantism. This is an important lesson, since the position-variantist explanation 
has been largely overlooked in the contemporary literature. One reason that 
position variantism has slipped under the radar, perhaps, is that many have 
regarded it as incompatible with intellectualism.  
I have shown that position variantism and intellectualism are compatible. 
The price for marrying position variantism with intellectualism is to endorse the 
view that S’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p may vary with contexts in an 
epistemically interesting way. Is this the right price to pay? I do not give an answer 
here. If what has been argued above is correct, perhaps this is the price we have to 
pay if we are going to respect our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases.40 
                                                        
40 I want to Matt McGrath for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This paper is 
funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of Taiwan (R.O.C.) (MOST 107-
2410-H-194-MY2) 
